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Abstract
A central challenge for the common model and for Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) is the development of functional human-
like agents capable of performing complex tasks in dynamic real-world environments. The cognitive test-bed model approach is a 
method of applying Allen Newell’s Single Complex Task Analysis method to create a human-like AGI. In addition to the 
environment, we include expertise in the test-bed. The expertise is placed in the agent, and the agent is placed within the 
environment and provided with complex tasks to perform. The agent development process and agent task performance was gauged 
for backwards compatibility in the performance of open-ended tasks.
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1. Introduction
Newell famously proposed the development of a functional, unified cognitive architecture [10]. The unified 
architecture is to be implemented as a control structure for a full agent, requiring the linking of bands and system levels 
of cognition within a single cognitive model ([10, 11], see [1] for a review). In addition to the unified cognitive 
architecture, Newell described methodologies for researching unified cognition. One method, which has rarely been 
used, is to model a complex task in its entirety [10]. Focusing on the analysis of a complex task can provide insight 
into the control system for human cognition that cannot be attained from the exploration of multiple small tasks 
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performed within highly controlled, and most often artificial settings [10, 11]. The complex task approach to cognitive 
model development also makes sense for the design and testing of artificial general intelligence (AGI). 
The study of cognition can be subdivided into two categories: microcognition and macrocognition [2, 8]. 
Microcognition is the type of cognition that is elicited by and can be measured and studied through controlled 
experimental conditions and environments. Macrocognition refers to the type of cognition that is produced in the real 
world. The distinguishing features of macrocognitive tasks include factors such as dynamically changing 
environments, unexpected events, team work, multiple conflicting goals, social and emotional reactions, and so on. 
Our interpretation of modelling a task in its entirety is that the task should be situated in a realistic macro cognitive 
environment. In particular we are interested in modelling high level, strategic decision making in real world expertise.
One of the strengths of the common model architecture, as implemented in various specific architectures (e.g., 
ACT-R, SOAR, EPIC), is that it can simulate human expertise [12, 14, 15, 16]. In these simulations the goal is to 
program the agent to carry out the expertise in the environment. In our opinion, the common model architecture has 
already been shown to be successful in this area. Our goal is different, we want to build on this success and simulate 
how experts manage conflicting high level goals within dynamic real world environments. As part of this we will 
implement a model of real world expertise in the agent, but we consider the expertise model to be part of the testbed 
and not the object of the testing. The goal for the testbed is to provide (1) an environment to put the agent in and (2) 
expert knowledge to put into the agent. The purpose of the testbed is to stress the agent architecture by having it 
execute its expertise under various challenging circumstances.
We selected the task of bartending for our simulation due to the high degree of expertise required for task 
performance and the naturally dynamic, interruption-filled environment. We are implementing this in an iterative way 
by creating a single agent whose knowledge and skills evolve over time along with the complexity of the environment 
and the level of expertise required to perform the bartending job within it. 
Our agent was given a name, Rachel, to signify the consistency of using the same agent each time. We believe that 
the level of consistency provided by developing a single agent will provide a clearer sense of progress and 
development. Also, in addition to Rachel’s bartending expertise, we are developing other aspects of Rachel profile to 
provide conflicting goals. For example, Rachel likes daydreaming and planning her next holiday, two goals that 
conflict with her bartending duties. Eventually, we want Rachel to have a backstory, a form of personality, an 
emotional style, and values around topics such as sports, religion, and politics. In this sense, the intention is for Rachel 
to be like a character in a novel, rather than a generic bartender. However, as described below, adding relatively simple 
conflicting goals makes significant structural demands on the architecture.
As West and MacDougall pointed out, the result of everyone building their own macrocognitive models has been 
a proliferation of unrelated models [22]. This state of affairs is open to the same criticism that Newell levelled at micro 
models and psychology experiments, that is, there is no unification and therefore limited progress [10]. To deal with 
this we propose our system as a generic macrocognitive test-bed for common model architectures to facilitate 
comparison, integration and sharing of knowledge bases. In this paper we describe the generic structure of our test-
bed, such that it can be shared and implemented in any of the common model architectures. Also, more generally, we 
describe a way of creating test-beds that can be used to generate other macrocognitive test-beds for different purposes 
and different forms of expertise.
2. Test Bed Components
According to Newell, to predict the behaviour of an expert agent within a real-world setting and task you need to 
define: “the goals of the agent, the environmental and task structures, and a complete actualization of the unified 
cognitive architecture within the agent,” [10]. Newell’s components are the foundation for our common model test-
bed. The process of creating the testbed has four parts: (1) expertise is defined in terms of the goals and the task 
structures required for the expert task; (2) the environment is built to allow all the actions required to execute the 
expertise to be carried out, (3) the agent is provided with the expertise as well as goals and activities that can conflict 
with the expertise, and (4), the architecture is tested to see if it has the functionality to deal with external interruptions 
from the environment and internal interruptions from competing goals.
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2.1. Goals and Task Structure
Newell proposed that modelling an expert would be the most effective way to model the whole of a complex task, 
as experts have extremely well practiced knowledge pertaining to goals, task method, order and performance [11]. 
GOMS was developed by Card, Moran and Newell for modelling expert tasks (usually related to a computer interface) 
[3]. GOMS stands for Goals, Operators, Methods, and Selection rules. GOMS can be seen as a system for 
hierarchically arranging goals and subgoals (into methods and unit tasks) so as to execute operators in an expert 
manner, according to selection rules.
In a limited sense, GOMS was the first success in fully modelling a complex task. However, GOMS is restricted 
to modelling individuals performing clearly defined tasks in isolation, under ideal conditions. Sociotechnical GOMS 
(SGOMS) is a version of GOMS that allows GOMS structures to be used in multi-agent sociotechnical environments, 
with interruptions and unexpected events [23]. The SGOMS macrocognitive architecture adds a higher-level control 
system of planning units that can be used to strategize and plan, as well as react to unexpected events and re-plan new 
goals and subgoals as required by the dynamic environment.
We are implementing the goals and the task structures of expert bartending within an SGOMS model, to provide 
the expertise for the test-bed. However, the development of the SGOMS expert bartending model is not the final 
product. The purpose of building in expertise is to approach a human level of complexity in terms of knowledge and 
skill development. To cause the agent to go beyond the execution of routine expertise we add challenges. Challenges 
can be of two types, external and internal. 
For the external challenges, we are using a dynamic environment with unexpected events. For the internal 
challenges, we are using an intermittent planning task that is unrelated to the expert task, specifically, planning a 
holiday. The test for the common model agent is to use the expert knowledge from the SGOMS model to simulate 
human behaviour in the dynamic environment, while simultaneously dealing with competing goals and interruptions. 
In other words, the task for the test-bed is to manage internal and external conflicts that are both complex and ongoing.
2.2. Environment
Environments are often a secondary consideration in modeling, however, determining the validity of the agent 
depends on the validity of the task environment. Humans fluidly operate between multiple and distinct settings, even 
when doing the same task. Furthermore, real life environments are dynamic, so their features can change during the 
task, requiring the agent to modify goals and strategies without crashing. 
The impoverished environments in psychology experiments, although they serve a legitimate scientific purpose 
(control and isolation of variables), have been justly criticized for creating a false sense of ordered control for human 
cognition (e.g. [5, 7, 8, 19, 20]). Although Newell did not discuss the complexity of the environment and, indeed, 
suggested the highly controlled environment of chess as a candidate [10], we argue that his method of modelling a 
complex task is an effective way to address complex environments. 
The process of building realistic, multi-agent environments is a highly technical and detailed endeavour that needs 
to be organized to succeed. Therefore, we need to be clear about the principles used to generate the environment. 
Fundamentally, there are two different starting points for generating an agent/environment simulation. In environment 
driven simulations, the steps are to build the environment and then create agents capable of operating in it. In agent 
driven simulations, the steps are reversed, where agents are built first and then environments are created to suite and 
test them. 
The most extreme version of starting with an environment is to use real, physical environments and embody the 
agents in robots. The next most realistic way is to use a simulated physics environment and embody the agents in 
simulated robots. In contrast, the environment can be generated based on the needs of the agent and the specific tasks 
to be evaluated. These environments are highly artificial but are necessary, as current research lacks the ability to 
simulate complete models of perceptual/motor functions well enough to support higher level cognition in complex 
environments. For this reason, we are pursuing this option, although we note that the use of highly realistic 
environments is important for resolving perceptual/motor issues related to the common model.
The use of highly simplified environments to support agent behaviour relies on the theoretical assumption that 
perceptual/motor functions are modular and separate from central cognitive functions. Assuming this, 
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perceptual/motor functions can be modelled in an artificial way, provided the outcomes are represented to the central 
cognitive system in a valid way. Therefore, the simplified environment approach needs a theory and a methodology 
to create valid representations.
Another issue of modeling simplified environments is the danger of embedding problem solutions within the 
environment. As noted by Chalmers, French & Hofstadter [4], if you provide an agent with everything it needs to 
solve a problem, and little else, it will solve the problem. Natural problem space environments are filled with multiple 
alternate paths. Therefore, a realistic environment should provide alternative paths for agents to consider. Our 
solutions to the issues raised are as follows:
• Complexity: To create a realistic, complex environment we are basing it on the SGOMS model of professional 
bar tending. The environment consists of all the objects needed for agent to perform the expert actions. It is 
constructed using the Python ACT-R environment system and can be updated as the agent is updated. We also 
plan to develop a generic way of describing the environment that can be attached to the SGOMS model, so that it 
can be implemented in different common model systems.
• Dynamic: The bar contains patrons and other bartenders. The patrons make decisions based on the probability of 
behaviour and level of alcohol consumption. The other bartenders also follow the SGOMS model, but it is 
necessary for them to cooperate with each other. Taken together these processes generate an environment with 
significant dynamic properties.
• Representation Validation: Common model architectures of expertise can be criticized for using overly simplistic 
structures and ignoring problems related to representation, meaning, and grounding. Expert model 
representations are usually derived from a Knowledge Level analysis of the task. As West & Young note, this 
methodology can be justified by arguing that it is sufficient to use only the parts of the representations that 
influence the task [24]. This argument sidesteps complex issues related to representation, but it means that 
representations created in this way must be understood as task-bound simplifications. This caveat is acceptable 
for our purposes.
2.3. The Agent
To test a common-model agent within the test-bed environment, the agent must first be loaded with the expertise 
model and be provided with minimal perceptual/motor abilities to perceive and manipulate the objects in the 
environment. The agent is then loaded with at least one alternate, competing task and placed in the environment. We 
selected Python ACT-R [18] as our implementation platform, as it is compatible with the SGOMS expertise model, 
and because the ACT-R architecture has been successfully used to model and predict human behaviour in complex 
task performances [27].
3. Cognitive Test Bed Model Simulation
To develop the agent and the test-bed, we are using an iterative design approach [9]. We are in the initial stages of 
development, but already we’ve found that the sort of agents that are sufficient for modelling psychology experiments 
fail to act like humans when faced with even the simplest macro-level tasks. Failure to produce human-like behaviour 
is very valuable in early development phases as it reveals fundamental limitations of the architecture, enabling a more 
adept and comprehensive model to be developed in future iterations. The purpose of iterative development is to ensure 
that each stage of development is functional before moving to the next. This provides insight in developing a unified 
model, as one can isolate problems of functionality to iteration stages. With each iteration of development, we add a 
new component to test agent performance and check backwards compatibility. That is the new agent must also be able 
to complete all the previous tasks.
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3.1. Simulation 1: Walking in Park
The bar is attached to a park where agents can walk, have a smoke, socialize, etc. The initial task for our agent, 
Rachel, was to search for a location in the park, based on a landmark. The competing tasks were to take in the view 
of the park and daydream. In other words, we wanted to evaluate the agent’s ability to experience a wandering mind 
while managing a simple goal. 
For the visual search process, we used the SOS vision system in Python ACT-R, as it is capable of replicating 
results of human cognitive performance in visual search experiments [21, 26]. Similar to other visual search models, 
SOS vision can search for specific defining features of the target, such as object shape or colour. When a match is 
found SOS places the chunk representing the perceived features of the object in the visual buffer. This can then be 
compared to the features of the landmark goal stored in DM. If it is a match, the agent will engage their motor system, 
walking towards the landmark and completing the task at arrival. If it is not a match, the agent will return to the search 
state while wandering the park (i.e., randomly choosing locations to walk to).
However, this approach resulted in Rachel searching the park in a very intense, highly focused way. To allow Rachel
to take in the scenery while she searched, we augmented the visual module to process bottom up vision which
perceives random objects in the environment. To avoid interference with the top down search we augmented this
process by adding in the rule of bottom-up when not top-down, meaning that when the vision module is not following
top down instructions to search for a specific object or environmental feature, it is driven in a bottom up fashion by
the salience of objects in the environment. This allowed Rachel to see and remember other things as she wandered
through the park and consequently, to map her environment in memory.
To allow Rachel to daydream we used the same logic with declarative memory as we did with the visual system.
That is, we applied the bottom-up when not top-down rule. This means that whenever the declarative memory is not
busy with a request from the procedural module, it will retrieve various thoughts, stored as chunks, based on spreading
activation.
The purpose of the walking in the park simulation task was to test the ability of the agent to run multiple cognitive
functions in parallel. We found the simplicity of the task was extremely useful in this simulation, as we could analyze
how each additional component modified the behaviour of the agent. The architectural assumptions are illustrated in
Fig. 1.
Fig. 1. Top-Down (solid lines) and Bottom-Up (dotted lines) processing of internal and external information.
696 Kate Dudzik  et al. / Procedia Computer Science 145 (2018) 691–6986 Kate Dudzik et al. / Procedia Computer Science 00 (2019) 000–000
3.2. Simulation 2: The Annoying Light Task 
The next simulation was meant to test Rachel’s ability to deal with interruptions. To create this ability, we 
implemented the architectural modifications to the common model structure described by West & Young [24]. This 
approach uses an emotional module to represent the alarm function associated with amygdala. The emotional module 
functions as a shadow production system. It can see everything that is in all the buffers, but it cannot make requests 
from the other modules. Instead it places an alarm (low, medium, or high) in the emotional buffer, which alerts the 
procedural module to the issue. The interruption is then appropriately handled by the productions related to the 
SGOMS task management system.
The annoying light task involves serving food when the light from the kitchen comes on. Rachel is working alone, 
serving at the bar, so when the light comes on (medium interruption) she must finish whatever she is doing at the 
moment, get the food, deliver it, and go back to what she was doing. In the simulation the light comes on at random 
and quite frequently, so the task feels like it would be very annoying. However, the simulation was successful, 
demonstrating the agent’s ability to quickly and effectively switch tasks.
3.3. Simulation 3: Daydreaming at Work
Our next simulation was done to ensure backwards compatibility with the walk in the park simulation. In this 
simulation, the tasks and information provided to the agent in Simulation 1 and Simulation 2 were combined, allowing 
Rachel to daydream about her holiday while working alone at the bar and responding to the light for food pickup. 
The simulation could not run without crashing, as the architecture could not distinguish between bottom-up and 
top-down chunks of information. Specifically, the retrieved chunk from a top-down request from declarative memory 
could get replaced in the buffer by a bottom-up holiday memory before the appropriate top-down production could 
match to it. To fix the problem we altered the architecture to create separate bottom-up and top-down pathways, with 
their own buffers (see Fig. 2). In this system, unexpected bottom up information, such as a spider in a wine glass or 
remembering that you left the stove on, are handled by the emotional module by placing an alarm in the emotional 
buffer.
Fig. 2. Cognitive test-bed model with alternate top-down and bottom-up pathways.
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4. Future Directions
To build the agent, the tasks, and the environment we are using an iterative development method [9]. At each 
iteration, we require Rachel to complete all previous tasks as well as the additional tasks, without altering Rachel’s 
code. That is, we expect Rachel to be backwards compatible as her knowledge and abilities increase. 
To make the test bed generic and available to common model community we plan to make the SGOMS professional 
bartender model and the accompanying environment available in Github as pseudo code. That way others can 
contribute to the continued evolution of the agent knowledge base and skill set.
4.1. Values
In terms of next directions for Rachel, we will be focused on her values. The reason for this is Rachel’s need to be 
able to prioritize between distinct tasks at different times, based on her goals and the events in her environment. 
Broadly speaking, values enable the agent to make informed decisions consistent with bounded rationality [1, 11]. 
However, most models assume a single high-level task, where the values that motivate the task are simply assumed 
to exist [24] (see Fig. 3). Rachel is free to ignore customers (work task) and focus on her holiday (personal task), so 
she needs higher-level values to choose. 
We treat higher-level values as meta goals, which serve to deconflict and reprioritize task goals as new knowledge 
becomes available. Rachel has a high value attribution for acting conscientious, so she has the higher-level goal of 
performing her job well. However, she also values her personal life, so planning the holiday is important as well. 
Depending on the situation at hand and her own emotional needs she will switch tasks based on environmental and 
internal inputs. This requires feedback from Rachel’s current situation to the relative strength of her values within her 
current context (see Fig. 3).
Fig. 3. Traditional implicit assumption of high level values (top) and the explicit inclusion of values (bottom)
5. Conclusion
We are creating a macro cognitive test-bed for the development of agents. Ensuring backwards compatibility is an 
important part of this approach. The purpose is not to create one-off models for each specific environment and task, 
but to develop one agent that is capable of navigating environments and tasks as the agent grows in complexity. 
We are attempting to develop the test-bed as a generic test for common model architectures by describing the tasks, 
goals, expert knowledge, and environment in pseudo code. We hope to make this available soon on Github, where we 
can receive feedback. We also hope that this will encourage the development of other macro cognitive test-beds and 
a broader discussion of how to use Newell’s complex task methodology to develop the common model.
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